Situating itself within existing academic literature on political violence, this article will draw out the communicative dimensions behind VDR funerals. Arguing that this is both rational and performative at the one time, the article asserts that openly conducting ritualistic militarised funerals carries considerable propagandistic and strategic benefits for VDR groups. The article begins by contextualising the matter of VDR funerals within existing academic literature. This opens with an examination of the spoiler phenomenon within peace processes before proceeding to critically evaluate if, how and why VDR activity satisfies the criterion for being classified as spoiler violence.
Examination then turns to how ritualistic funerals are used during political conflict, with a particular emphasis placed on IRA funerals during the most recent phase of conflict. The remainder of the article is then committed to applying theoretical observations gleaned from existing academic literature to empirical data on VDR funerals sourced through media coverage of several high profile cases.
At this introductory juncture two caveats should be acknowledged. Firstly, it is important to note what this article does not address. Although this article examines the VDR phenomenon it does not provide an extensive overview of the origins of each VDR group, nor does it delve into how they differ from one another and neither does it address the matter of nonviolent political groups that have been labelled 'dissident republicans'. These matters have been adequately covered in existing studies.
Secondly, although the observations and conclusions made in this article are drawn from an examination of performative nonviolence at VDR funerals there is no reason to suggest that they cannot or do not apply to performative nonviolence at VDR commemorations too. These commemorations have also seen open parading of masked and armed men and ceremonial discharging of firearms. A more thorough and nuanced examination of VDR commemorations is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, a note on phraseology is warranted.
Notwithstanding that the term 'dissident republican' is politicised and/or contested, the term VDR is used herein due to its prominence in existing studies. Other terms, like 'occupation' for example, are used to reflect the VDR framing of the contemporary political situation in the North of Ireland.
Spoilers
Peace settlements come with two guarantees; some form of compromise is necessary and some protagonists will oppose this compromise. Those assuming this oppositional position have been termed 'spoilers'. Brewer defines spoilers as 'dissidents and corrupt regimes that refuse to go along with second-best preferences that form the basis of peace settlements and disrupt the process by violence in order to maintain their first-choice preference'. 6 Further to this conceptualisation, Newman and Richmond have defined 'spoiling' as 'tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means'. 7 The most obvious spoiling tactic is the continued use of violence. This, as Steenkamp argues, broadcasts a 'political message' that underlying conflict remains live despite any peace accord. 8 Spoilers have been further categorised into 'inside spoilers' who participate in peace negotiations and/or settlements with a view to sabotage from within or later reneging on commitments and 'outside spoilers' who are excluded or opt for selfexclusion from negotiations due to the nature of the settlement likely to arise. 9 Given that VDR groups oppose the core tenets of the negotiated settlement of conflict in the North of Ireland they clearly belong to the latter category. VDR activity therefore represents 'total spoiler violence' designed to derail the outworkings and embedding of the peace process. 10 While academic literature recognises the ineluctability of spoilers, other aspects of the phenomenon remain debated. In particular, there is a lack of consensus on typologies of spoiler, how restrictive or relaxed the concept should be and whether it should include or exclude nonviolence. 11 What Nilsson and Sorderberg-Kovacs note has emerged undisputed, though, is that there is fluidity in the concept that means spoilers can emerge latently after peace processes have entrenched political agreements. 12 Precisely because peace processes are long drawn out affairs spoilers can emerge later on in the process to coincide with the implementation of certain aspects of peace accords. 13 While an extensive overview of the origins and emergence of VDR groups is not within the scope of this article, a cursory glance at the burgeoning VDR scene shows that new groups have emerged more than a decade after the signing of the GFA. Granted, some VDR groups can trace their roots to opposition to the politicisation of the Provisional movement in the late 1980's and others to their support for the Mitchell Principles of nonviolence prior to the GFA but more modern permutations were born from latter day disillusionment with current Sinn Fein strategy. John Horgan argues that VDR has manifest itself in different temporal waves, with each wave corresponding to a particular timeframe contingent on developments (or lack thereof) in the peace process. 14 The most successful of these, the third wave, followed the 2007 endorsement of policing in Northern Ireland by Sinn Fein. This substantiates Tonge's argument that spoiler activity is choreographed around particular 'spoiler opportunities' that present themselves at particular intervals in peace processes. 15 However, while spoilers, spoiling and spoiler opportunities have been extensively studied within the context of violence, examination within a context of nonviolence has been sparse. This elides cases where violent spoiler groups also strategically engage in nonviolent tactics as part of their spoiling campaign. This is surprising given that spoilers can adapt and change tactics as needs necessitate. 16 It is with making a contribution towards rectifying this lacuna that this article concerns itself. By examining how VDR groups that use residual violence also use nonviolence as a spoiling tactic it is hoped that this article will provide a nuanced critique of this blind spot that can be extrapolated to the study of spoilers, spoiling and spoiler opportunities elsewhere.
VDR and spoiling
The emergence and subsequent growth of VDR groups showed that as the Provisional movement carefully exited armed struggle there were others ready and willing to take their place. It would be wrong, however, to present the VDR constituency as a heterogeneous monolith. Existing studies show that different VDR groups coalesce around different personalities, have different geographical loci, are in competition with one another and disagree over the finer points of anti-Provisional ideology. 17 Despite this, Morrison notes that the latest wave of VDR has paradoxically seen increased cooperation across groups (including some merging into the 'New IRA') but also increased factionalising of other groups. 18 What all these groups and factions have in common is rejection of current Sinn Fein strategy. There are two separate strands to this; purist ideological rejection of any internal settlement that falls short of national self-determination and more recent post-GFA disillusionment at failure to make sufficient advances while at the same time ceding further ideological ground for short term political gain at Stormont. The first strand is tied to trenchant opposition to acceptance of the GFA 'triple lock' veto that states Irish unity can only be secured through a referendum that has to be called by a British secretary of state and then endorsed by a majority of people in Northern Ireland as well as on the island of Ireland. The second is tied to the 2007 formal endorsement of policing by Sinn Fein in return for the re-establishment of powersharing institutions in Northern Ireland. VDR groups are spoilers in the sense that they reject the second-best option of internal settlement by continuing to pursue their primary objective through political violence (as per Brewer's definition) and because they have emerged latently in response to spoiler opportunities (as per Tonge's argument). Other analyses might, however, question the wisdom of labelling VDR groups as 'spoilers', seeing this as too reliant on liberal peace theory at the expense of distorting how a non-negotiable nationalist vision has fostered an ideological mind-set whereby any compromise, rather than the GFA specifically, is intolerable. 19 Rather than looking at how VDR activity is influenced by present necessities like disrupting internal settlement and dictated by current spoiler opportunities like Brexit, such a perspective places greater emphasis on the historicity of the purist ideology espoused by VDR groups.
Approached from this angle, VDR ideology and its use of funerary practice may seem more like a 'political religion' that is premised on transcendental visions of the nation and its people that feeds on the politics of icons which fuse the past, present and future through a dark liturgy based on ceremonies built around and including the bodies of dead patriots. 20 The initial wave of VDR saw the targeting of prestige targets on the British mainland like MI6 H.Q. and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) studios. 21 However, it was also during this phase that VDR groups alienated themselves through the mass killing of civilians at Omagh. The backlash that followed this botched attack forced VDR groups into a tactical retreat. 22 While VDR activity certainly continued following Omagh, the second wave was characterised by abject failure to sustain any notable level of violence. 23 Despite these setbacks, VDR groups emerged renewed following the Sinn Fein policing policy change. The third wave of VDR has seen them again attack prestige targets but confine this to Northern Ireland -MI5 H.Q. and the City of Culture offices in Derry being among the targets. 24 The third wave was also the most successful with VDR groups managing to kill two British sappers, two Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) constables and two prison warders. For all that, even the third wave of VDR pales in comparison to the Provisional campaign. 25 VDR groups have not shied away from the fact that their campaign has not matched the intensity of the Provisional campaign. The failure to so far mount a full frontal assault has been presented by VDR groups as a strategic decision designed to allow them to rebuild, reorganise and adapt to the challenges of the existing context. 26 However, while they acknowledged a tactical lull in activity they also placed on record their ability to carry out attacks 'at a time and place of our choosing'. 27 This is far from baseless rhetoric, with Sanders noting that the pre-2007 period of relative VDR inactivity ultimately benefitted VDR groups as they unleashed their most effective campaign to date after emerging from this lull. 28 More recently the threat of attack 'at a time and place of our choosing' has been accompanied by a warning about an increase in numbers, weaponry and expertise. A failed New IRA grenade attack on a police patrol was claimed in a statement that highlighted how 'our capacity to target state forces is increasing and developing' while retaining ability to strike 'at a time of our choosing'. 29 Sophie Whiting contends that while spoiler theories are certainly useful in conceptualising and explaining VDR they should not discount the importance of historical determinism and claims to legitimacy that have consistently underpinned all Irish republican violence. 30 Indeed, Whiting's argument is borne out in the discourses constructed by VDR groups whereby spoiling the GFA internal settlement may be their immediate aim but in the long run their aim is to force the reunification of Ireland. VDR discourse therefore combines historical determinism with a rejection of internal settlement:
Since 1921 there have been a series of 'agreements' culminating with the St Andrews Agreement in 2006. However none of these agreements constituted a settlement of the conflict in Ireland because they have each failed to address the cause of that conflict -which is the British occupation and partition of Ireland. As a result we have had a cycle of resistance followed by an 'agreement' followed by yet more resistance. 31 This statement, made in the aftermath of the most militarily successful few days in VDR history, neatly sums up the retrospective lens that conditions VDR self-justification. It follows a simple logic; there has always been armed struggle against occupation and there will always be armed struggle against occupation. In one fell swoop it casts off Sinn Fein criticism about the lack of support, level of activity and lack of a mandate, 32 to couch itself in the 'comforting republican self-justification' that the use of armed struggle by previous generations provides the only mandate needed. 33 This reflects the four tenets that traditionally underpin the self-legitimacy of physical force republicanism; the use of force is legitimate, the Republic is not an object to be negotiated for, acceptance of an outcome falling short of the Republic is a betrayal and a small group can define and defend the national honour. 34 These tenets are timeless meaning they apply without inflection to the guerrilla days of Tom Barry, the leaner days of the Border Campaign, the halcyon days of the Provisional campaign and the latest wave of VDR.
An examination of the nature of the ongoing VDR campaign shows that while it certainly fits the matrix of spoiler violence this is nonetheless spoiler violence framed by historical determinism. National selfdetermination may be the ultimate aim but the prelude to this is successfully curtailing the increasing normalisation of society. Without this the contested nature of the post-GFA state and the continued denial of self-determination are removed from open sight:
Whilst dissident violence will not achieve a united Ireland in terms of sending the 'Brits home', it is also about perception. In creating a perceived threat, dissidents have the potential to prevent the impression of Northern Ireland being a normalised, consolidated state. 35 This has conditioned VDR strategy whereby attacks are directed at security force targets and at nonsecurity targets likely to create disruption. 36 The adoption of this strategy substantiates Newman and Richmond's point that the nature and dynamic of the initial conflict will condition any subsequent spoiling activity. 37 For VDR groups this means that inasmuch as the 'Brits' need sent 'home' the post-GFA state also needs challenged to the point of unsustainability. So although VDR groups locate their violence in a historic timeline that long precedes the GFA, at the same time it is patently clear, even from their own statements and targets, that in the immediate term their campaign is essentially a spoiler campaign. For Morrison this means that VDR activity is 'no longer just a Brits out war' but is also about staking a claim to being the only legitimate republicans at the expense of Sinn Fein by attacking symbols of Sinn Fein politicisation and post-GFA normalisation like the reformed Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). 38 Given that Sinn Fein has used their own political growth to dull the appeal of VDR groups, 39 the VDR turn to attacking targets linked to Sinn Fein driven normalisation reveals that spoiling activity can also be played out as a contest between the drivers and wreckers of transition. Pearlman, for example, noted similar interplay between moderates and spoilers in Palestine. 40 Indeed, VDR groups have gone as far as bluntly stating they have 'no desire to replicate or be a morph of the Provisional IRA' because, unlike the Provisionals, they intend to succeed with their campaign. 41 In chasing the victory that eluded the Provisionals, VDR groups aim to firstly 'engage normalisation head on', 42 and then, having done so, draw armed British soldiers back onto the streets to dispel the 'facade' that 'normality reigns' by reminding people of the continued British occupation of Ireland. 43 Whatever the likelihood of this ever occurring, much less succeeding, the reality remains that propaganda about a groups capabilities and the likely achievability of its goals does not have to be true, it just has to be believed. 44 So while VDR activity may not have come close to realising its longer term goals, it has at least shown the capacity to cash the cheques it has written in relation to disrupting certain aspects of normalisation. Whatever its shortcomings in comparison to the Provisional campaign, VDR has nonetheless established itself as 'an everyday feature of the security landscape'. 45 Moreover, where aspects of policing are concerned it has also proven itself capable of curtailing community policing initiatives by ensuring that counter-insurgency still conditions security policy. 46 This reality has been utilised by VDR groups in their discourse, with the Real IRA previously arguing that its campaign had adversely impacted on normalisation because despite increasing talk of unarmed policing their operations meant 'they're back wearing flak jackets and still carrying guns.
Strand Road barracks in Derry is being refortified to make it rocket proof'. 47 It is evident, then, that even if VDR activity has not prevented the normalisation process per se it is nevertheless capable of frustrating efforts at normalisation in key areas.
Political funerals
VDR groups are not the first or only violent political groups to stage highly performative funerals.
Although not necessarily used as a spoiling tactic elsewhere, the practice is widespread.
Understanding how and why performative nonviolence in the form of funerary practice can be a useful spoiling tactic for VDR groups is contingent on firstly understanding the more general dynamic and motivation behind such funerals. Using the example of Palestine, Allen argues that politicised funerals perform a socializing function that generates mobilisation. 48 In a similar vein, Ramphele notes that in Apartheid South Africa political funerals became a forum of stage managed 'political theatre' designed to afford those staging them maximum political capital. 49 Although sombre affairs, political funerals entail fanfare and performative ceremony. 50 Laden with ritualism, they are fertile ground for violent political groups because a mobilised support base is physically congregated around a certain object, making them propagandistically valuable given the heightened media attention. 51 The bhogs (funeral ceremony) of Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) martyrs in the Punjab, for example, were used to garner public sympathy and to mobilise existing and new support. 52 In Indonesia the funerals of Jihadists have served as a unifier for diverse groups to share a common aktivis Islam (Islamic activist) identity. 53 Accordingly, ritualistic political funerals help violent political groups project a certain image and/or message -whether it is an image of solidarity amongst factions or a plea for increased mobilisation. The communicative nature of these funerals mirrors the more general communicative dimension of political violence itself. Despite disagreement on whether political violence is ultimately more rational or performative in nature, the academic literature does at least agree that it is invariably communicative. 54 An act of political violence, whether primarily regarded as being rational or performative in nature, is nonetheless predicated on broadcasting a message to any number of audiences. This could be the potential fellow traveller, the enemy or, in the case of VDR groups, a society increasingly conforming to post-GFA normalisation. This line of reasoning can be extended to strategic expressions of nonviolence like VDR funerals. It may even be argued that this political nonviolence is at the same time both rational and performative; rational in that it is a mobilisation strategy and performative in that the ritualistic fanfare is the propagandistic bait that not only further underpins mobilisation but also attracts media attention. In other words, the strategic calculation underpins the performative nature of the act as much as the performative nature influences the strategic calculation behind it.
Irish republicans have a lengthy history of staging ritualistic funerals. The importance of funerary practice within the ideology reflects how it has traditionally looked upon martyrdom as the redemptive expression of victory through death. 55 The centrality of funerary practice infused with dark liturgy to the Irish republican model of martyrdom stretches back for centuries. 56 Historically it has proven valuable by plugging a gap for movements lacking popular support and resources, bestowing some semblance of legitimacy, providing models of emulation for contemporaries and fostering a link between followers of the cause and dead martyrs. 57 Traditionally funerals have been used to claim the deceased as a soldier through a performative process involving military trappings, masked guards of honour and a volley of shots over the coffin. 58 The Provisionals used ritualistic funerary practice to confer legitimacy onto their violence, to mobilise their support base, attract new recruits and to send a message of defiance and continued resistance. 59 This demonstrates the convergence of theoretical observations on the rational and performative basis of political violence whereby Irish republicans have historically found funerals useful in terms of mobilisation (rational) and propaganda (performative). One notable example being the funeral of Bobby Sands that captured global attention and brought 100,000 people onto the streets of Belfast. The same act of political (non)violence proved at once to be both strategically and rhetorically valuable. The public act of claiming the dead as a soldier, however, drew Irish republicans into further violent confrontation with a state intent on suppressing any ceremony giving IRA violence a degree of political legitimacy. Determined to prevent any funerary display amounting to an Irish republican show of strength or assertion of political legitimacy, the security force response turned these funerals into battles between the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and mourners. Bobby Storey, who was responsible for organising hunger striker Joe McDonnell's funeral, contextualised the state response as follows:
The attack of Joe's funeral… was a political decision and a pre-planned act of aggression against the mourners by the British Army and RUC... it potentially shaped policy for the many assaults on republican funerals through the 1980's by a British government not prepared to allow such demonstrations of support for republicanism to proceed unhindered. 60 The security forces went to extraordinarily violent lengths in response to republican funerals; the IRA firing party at McDonnell's funeral was fired on (and later arrested) by Royal Marines, 61 Larry Marley's Ardoyne home was besieged by the RUC for two days 62 and mourners at the funeral of Paddy Deery and Eddie McSheffrey in Derry were baton charged and fired on with plastic bullets by the RUC. 63 However, as Crenshaw observes, 64 overzealous state responses ultimately prove counter-productive.
Despite a sizeable security presence and the likelihood of attack, republican funerals continued to attract thousands of mourners and continued to provide grist to the republican propaganda mill.
Republican communities were seen to be dignified and resilient while the RUC were portrayed as sectarian and vindictive. 65 Drawing comparisons with Apartheid South Africa, republicans quickly exploited the security response at the Marley funeral by arguing that 'nobody who has seen the television image of funerals in Soweto or other black African townships could fail to make the comparison with events in Belfast this week'. 66 For Bowyer-Bell the drastic security miscalculation in responding so violently effectively transformed each targeted funeral into a small scale Palestinian intifada on the streets of the six counties 67 -something endowed with strategic and propagandistic advantages for Irish republicans.
While this historic context is no doubt useful, it would be erroneous to draw simplistic 'like for like' comparisons between past republican funerals and those staged by VDR groups today. For sure, there has been little substantive change in the process of claiming the dead as a soldier or in the established script of the funerary procession but there has been significant contextual change in the political climate the funerals are occurring in and the security response to them. Likewise, the rational and performative underpinnings are still present as is the political need to claim the dead as a soldier but the motivation for mobilising and the exact nature of the message communicated have been adapted to make them more conducive to historical determinist framed spoiling. Applying the theoretical arguments on spoiling, VDR and the political use of funerals to empirical data on VDR funerals, the following section proceeds to critically evaluate how performative nonviolence in the form of funerary practice has become a VDR spoiling tactic.
VDR funerals
Irish republicans have continued to bury their dead as soldiers post-GFA. There are, however, key differences depending on whether the funeral is being overseen by Sinn Fein or by VDR groups. Unlike the latter, the former have been demilitarised in keeping with a new dispensation. Veteran republicans supportive of the Sinn Fein strategy have still been buried as soldiers with a tricolour and beret and gloves on their coffins but there has been no firing of shots, the oration has been used to map their personal transformation from war to peace and masked guards of honour have been This is not only an assertion of political legitimacy during a period when the legitimacy of physical force republicanism has been questioned more than ever but it also feeds into nationalistic discourses on martyrdom -albeit without the heroic backdrop of death in service of one's country on the battlefield that framed Provisional funerals. 70 Notwithstanding this, burying them as soldiers highlights the fact that, from the VDR perspective, there is still a war ongoing in the six counties. It also usefully serves to counter state criminalisation discourse, increasingly subscribed to by 'former comrades' in Sinn Fein, 71 and goes further in buttressing against similar criticism about the lack of an all-out VDR campaign capable of achieving any realistic degree of military advancement. The adoption of the same performative funeral rituals once used by the Provisionals mirrors a more general trend of VDR groups borrowing tactics, strategy and discourse from previous IRA campaigns. 72 In this case, the borrowing of ritualism is less militarily orientated and more concerned with spectacle, making VDR funerals an integral component in what Weimann might label 'the theatre of terror' whereby the primary concern is exposure for the action rather than long term military effect. 73 An intercepted VDR communiqué made public by the PSNI showed that VDR groups are attuned to the strategic importance of funerals and how they can be used as occasions of spectacle and fiery oration. 74 Underpinning this is the fact that these funerals are communicative. As such, like all VDR statements and actions, they are aimed at internal and external audiences with a dualistic purpose of generating support within the ingroup while simultaneously generating fear through communicating the capacity of its threat to various outgroups. 75 The militaristic displays on show at VDR funerals therefore communicate several key messages including that VDR groups are too strong to be ignored, that they represent a viable threat, that they are open for business and worthy of support and that Sinn Fein moderates cannot guarantee the peace. It is worth further elaborating on the different messages that VDR funerary practice communicates to different audiences.
The spoiler message
The use of VDR funerals as a spoiling tactic demonstrates a more fundamental reality that VDR groups do not have to mount successful attacks on the security forces to effectively spoil. Morrison and Horgan argue that even failed attacks are sufficient to communicate the VDR threat, capabilities and capacity to disrupt normalisation. 76 In fact, it could be argued further that even the implication of violence through a hoax will suffice. This extends to the sight of gun-toting masked republicans whether roaming the streets in a PR show of bravado or delivering the ritualistic final salute at funerals. Violence is not actually exercised in these cases but the implication that VDR groups have capacity to so inflict violence is suffice to challenge perceptions of normalisation. In terms of being a spoiling tactic, the performative nonviolence on display at VDR funerals shows that militant republicanism has not gone away and that it can still bring hundreds of people onto the streets if necessary despite political talk of the increasing normalisation of post-GFA society. There is, after all, very little that can be considered normal about the open parading of masked and armed men and women.
This symbolic challenge to normalisation has been nurtured via heightened media coverage of VDR funerals. Although this coverage is highly condemnatory it is still providing VDR groups with the necessary exposure to challenge assertions of post-GFA normalisation. This is evident in the following extract from the Daily Mail in relation to the Brady funeral:
It is the kind of chilling scene that should have been consigned to history. Clad in military fatigues and their faces hidden by balaclavas , Irish republican gunmen unleashed a volley of shots over an IRA murderer's coffin. As they emptied their chambers over the tri-colour draped casket, a 400-strong crowd roared with approval. 77 Moreover, given the increased use of social media by politically violent groups 78 -including VDR groups 79 -footage of these funerals have been posted, shared and 'liked' on YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. Admittedly, these spectacles offer little in terms of making any military headway in the VDR campaign yet they are nevertheless a valuable spoiling tactic because they feed into 21st century 'imagefare' where perceptions of what is happening on the ground are shaped by images from the media and social media. 80 The message that VDR groups are able to communicate through this 'imagefare' cuts against the grain of political discourse about a new dispensation in post-GFA Northern Ireland. This much is evident from the political outcry following VDR funerals, with one Unionist politician deriding the Catney funeral display because:
It's something we thought had been left behind and it's very clear that the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland want to see these things condemned to the past and we don't want to see this on our streets... there's no place for any such commemorations in this society. 81 The same politician condemned McLaughlin's funeral as 'a deplorable sight from yesteryear and not a welcome one'. 82 Besides challenging normalisation through the media, VDR funerals can also challenge normalisation on the ground by creating significant disruption. They are usually protracted and well attended affairs that cause street closures and traffic delays. This makes them a spoiling tactic by virtue of the fact that they obtrusively impact on the daily lives of some in a very real sense -even if only momentarily. For example, the funeral -complete with a militarised guard of honour comprising of dozens of masked people -of Irish Republican Socialist Movement veteran Peggy O'Hara was said to have brought Derry to a 'standstill'. 83 In bringing armed and masked republicans along with hundreds of supporters onto the streets VDR funerals can be regarded as a form of spoiler 'propaganda by the deed'. 84 Their discourse about being able to disrupt normalisation seems empirically credible even when they are not militarily engaging the security forces.
External/internal audiences
The core of the spoiler message constructed through the open parading of masked and armed volunteers at VDR funerals where the dead are claimed as soldiers is that militant republicans still exist, they have access to weapons and they have support. This message not only challenges criminalisation discourses of the post-GFA state and 'former comrades' but also contests the Weberian notion that the state has the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This message is directed at both external and internal audiences.
For the external audience, VDR funerals are an 'open challenge' tactic 85 asserting that VDR groups still exist and are still opposed to the normalisation process even though their military activity has been low intensity. There is an irony in the fact that VDR groups would use funerals in this way given that the Continuity IRA chose to announce its arrival by firing a volley of shots over the grave of Commandant Tom Maguire in 1994. 86 Nonetheless, when it comes to post-GFA spoiling through 'propaganda by the deed', funerals are well publicised opportunities to engage normalisation discourses through performative nonviolence. The veracity of this can be seen in one Unionist politician's argument that the firing of shots at McLaughlin's funeral was 'a stark reminder, if such were needed, that extremist republican terrorists are still active in Ardoyne'. 87 Far from being coincidental, the display was designed to deliberately communicate this very message. Moreover, through these displays VDR groups have indicated that although they have yet to seriously threaten the stability of the post-GFA state they have nevertheless demonstrated their capacity for something more precious in protracted asymmetrical conflict -continued survival. 88 This is far from a trivial point. Showing the capacity for continued survival not only underpins discourses on historical determinism but is also in itself an important challenge to normalisation. The Granted VDR groups have not been particularly successful in halting normalisation thus far given that society has been able to continue functioning around the threat in a way it could not with the Provisional campaign. 89 However, for all that, VDR groups have been able to survive not only increased post-GFA normalisation but also the ignominy of Omagh, the early imprisonment of their leadership, state infiltration, ostracising by 'former comrades' turned peacemakers, the increased rigour of modern anti-terror provisions and factionalising. In fact, they successfully adapted their strategy, regrouped and then subsequently expanded before going on to enjoy greater military success. 90 Surviving these setbacks is no mean feat given that groups like the Red Brigades in Italy crumbled under lesser pressures in the past. 91 Cumulatively this suggests, in line with VDR self-discourse framed by historical determinism, that the VDR campaign is not going to dissipate anytime soon. 92 If anything, increases in knowhow, expertise and activity suggests it is more likely to continue and/or expand rather than disappear in the near future.
Internally, funerals have a more strategic purpose that feed into mobilisation and the development of VDR activity beyond 'Brits out'. The use of funerals as political theatre reflects the rational-choice based decisions politically violent groups take that are premised on drawing in peripheral support. 93 On the one hand this involves demonstrating that VDR groups, contrary to official discourse and that of Sinn Fein, have a level of 'auspicious support' equating sympathy with its cause rather than active assistance in its campaign, 94 yet on the other hand it necessitates building on this auspicious support by converting it into more active support. In order to do so VDR groups have again reverted to Provisional discursive tactics and dark liturgy that are emotionally rich in nationalistic appeal through lionising the dead as honourable and idealistic soldiers of the people. VDR funerals have been romanticised on social media 95 and infused with the inherent emotional pull that the rhetoric of 'the few against the many' has. 96 In sum, the discourse constructed through VDR funerals is one where the dead, and by extension of this their VDR comrades, fought on behalf of the people with the support of the people at great personal cost that entailed not only being persecuted by the state but also shunned and condemned by 'former comrades'.
The crux of this message can be seen as the point where the strategic and propagandistic importance of funerals for VDR groups converge. In ideologising funerary practice with their own distinct ideology, VDR groups are able to channel the power of ideology that ties the past, present and future together through rituals and symbols vital to the follower's sense of being into their dead comrades. 97 This locates VDR groups within the longue duree of armed struggle, and in doing so transforms the dead into symbols to be read simultaneously in terms of what they stand for and what they stand against; they stand for the absolutist goal of self-determination as fought for in successive generations and they stand against the latest abandonment of that goal through the GFA internal settlement. While this provides rhetorical soundbites in funeral orations there is, of course, a strategic calculation behind it too. Dark liturgy like this is, after all, engaged with a view to provoking action among the congregation it is projected on to. 98 On the one hand this might simply be using dead comrades to reify the commitment of existing members. 99 On the other hand, for Irish republicans it has also performed an arguably more important recruitment function via building an emotive connection between the dead and new martyrs-to-be who having borne witness to the sacrifice of others are now prepared to step up to the challenge themselves. 100 Armed struggle, once waged by the dead but soon to be waged by those in the funeral crowds prepared to take on their mantle, is thus read as an 'instrument of regeneration'. 101 Admittedly, where VDR groups are concerned all of this must be seen within the context of a post-GFA six counties embracing normalisation. Using the dead as mobilising symbols can indeed rely more on cultural pull rather than material benefit, 102 yet the value of this to politically violent groups trying to mobilise and legitimise itself in conditions as unfavourable as those facing VDR groups should not be dismissed. 103 Granted, any recruits drawn to VDR groups through funerals will not be thrust into the rough and tumble of the heady days of the Provisionals. For the time being at least they will have to content themselves with trying to disrupt the normalisation process through sporadic violence -the important thing, though, is that in being there for when the war against the British occupier resumes they have fulfilled their remit of replenishing the legions of faithful soldiers. More immediately though, VDR funerals rich in dark liturgical symbolism have the benefit of transforming seemingly abstract 'high politics' into a dynamic of lived political power that is openly manifesting itself on the streets. 104 In short, for VDR groups this has the propagandistic advantage of demonstrating that far from being a spent political force, militant republicanism is resurgent and personified by the masses of people joining masked and armed republicans in tribute to the dead.
The strategic importance of political funerals and the development of VDR beyond 'Brits out' activity can be seen in the case of the Catney funeral. The funeral was a well attended and much publicised affair, with the image of the masked guard of honour and the firing of shots in salute the previous evening making the headlines. This not only sent a message about the continued existence of VDR groups and their access to weapons to post-GFA society but more importantly it sent the same message to its internal support base and to its enemies; we have not gone away, we have weapons and although they are only being ceremonially fired in tribute tonight in the future we will turn them on the security forces. Internally this is an appeal for support and a vote of confidence yet externally it is a menacing warning of future intent. The occasion was also used to show a united VDR front, with 'a number of prominent republicans who have fallen out of step with Sinn Fein' in attendance. 105 The parading of Catney's coffin at Milltown cemetery carried a particular internal message that may have bypassed less informed observers. 106 The republican plot in Milltown cemetery is the commemorative Mecca of Sinn Fein where political speak of continuing the armed struggle of the past by political means has been in constant and ready supply since the GFA. 107 The parading of Catney's remains there by VDR groups was a brazen two fingered gesture to their 'former comrades' and a challenge to their hegemony of the legacy of the republican war dead. Indeed, VDR groups have been keen to use other occasions like commemorations to the same effect too. 108 This illustrates the intricacies of the internal politicking that conditions VDR discourse and activity; as much as it is about excoriating 'the Brits' it is also about condemning 'former comrades' who now assist 'the Brits' through involvement in partitionist institutions and support for a colonial police force.
For all that they have dominated the news headlines, VDR funerals have not drawn an aggressive security response. Instead of intervening in situ the PSNI have patiently moved against those involved in VDR paramilitary displays when less confrontational circumstances exist. This has led to criticism that VDR groups 'can flaunt the law, break the law and the police simply don't turn up'. 109 This criticism, however, fails to acknowledge that the security forces have actively monitored these funerals from a distance with the intention of gathering evidence and taking later action. 110 The PSNI have made a number of arrests relating to VDR funerals, including three following the O'Hara funeral 111 and another 15 following the funeral of Michael Barr. 112 The PSNI have also pursued those involved in the logistical organisation of VDR funerals and commemorations under newer anti-terror provisions that were not available to curtail paramilitary funerals during the Provisional campaign.
Most notably this relies on the 'glorification of terrorism' offence contained in Section 1 Terrorism Act 2006 and the offence of assisting in arranging or managing a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation under Section 12 Terrorism Act 2000. These charges were brought in relation to the Brady funeral 113 and in relation to a commemoration in Derry where Marian Price, among others, was charged for holding a statement threatening military action against the security forces that was being read out by a masked man. 114 Moreover, the PSNI have also stated that they will apply facial recognition software they have successfully used in the past to footage of VDR displays at funerals and commemorations with a view to making further arrests. 115 The ability of the PSNI to rely on this technology shows how the circulation of footage on social media is a double edged sword for VDR groups; it is valuable propagandistically but practically it is a security risk because of advances in modern technology and heightened anti-terror provisions that contain glorification and organisation offences unheard of in the past.
Evidently, the security forces have not been inactive in tackling VDR funerals even if they have not made onground interventions. The avoidance of this through a low-key approach reliant on processing the matter through the courts is doubtless a deliberate policy that recognises how any security miscalculation would be advantageous to VDR groups. Firstly, recourse to the criminal justice system reinforces the state criminalisation discourse that denies VDR groups any political legitimacy.
Secondly, it withholds a propaganda victory that would aid mobilisation and generate further sympathy. Thirdly, a violent security response would be in furtherance of the VDR end goal of disrupting normalisation through 'propaganda by the deed'. And finally, an aggressive intervention would be disastrous in terms of ongoing PSNI community policing initiatives designed to win over Nationalist communities. VDR groups are no doubt aware of this and have capitalised on it by turning performative nonviolence via funerals into low-investment but high-dividend spoiling activity.
Disrupting normalisation as such, while certainly not cost free, is a less risky form of 'propaganda by the deed' than military activity like launching a grenade attack on a PSNI patrol where VDR operatives could be arrested, injured or killed or, worse still, members of the public could be caught in the crossfire leading to another anti-VDR backlash. Whether the more sophisticated security response that draws on technological advances alters this in terms of cost-benefit calculations remains to be seen. In the meantime VDR funerals will continue to represent a nonviolent equivalent to other spoiler tactics like using vigilantism to stem normalisation of policing and to confer self-legitimacy through punishment attacks.
Conclusion
A critical examination of VDR funerary practice shows Morrison's criticism that not enough attention is being paid to instances of VDR nonviolence is indeed well founded. By restricting the lens of study to violent attacks on the security forces or the vigilantism of punishment attacks the strategic use of nonviolence within wider VDR spoiler strategy and discourse is obscured. This oversight has created a significant blind spot in the literature on VDR in terms of how it enacts discourses on historical determinism and fighting normalisation processes through highly performative nonviolent means capable of generating mobilisation and propaganda. In seeking to contribute to recent tentative attempts to extend the academic study of VDR to its strategic usage of nonviolence, this article has shown that funerals are valuable to VDR groups in terms of mobilisation and propaganda because they not only adhere to self-discourses of historical determinism but are also naturally conducive to post-GFA spoiling. What this shows is that performative nonviolence is as useful to spoilers as residual violence is, particularly so when they are able to gain considerable exposure and propaganda from it and when this can compensate in part for lack of a more protracted campaign of actual violence. As VDR groups have illustrated through their use of performative nonviolence, there is no reason why the strategic and performative uses of nonviolence should not be included in studies on spoilers and spoiling tactics.
On the one hand VDR funerals draw on the longstanding Irish republican tradition of burying the dead as soldiers. Propagandistically this is useful in terms of constructing legitimacy for VDR violence in a post-GFA era where there is less appetite within the wider Nationalist constituency for armed struggle, where the VDR campaign is unfavourably compared to the Provisional campaign, where this activity has been vociferously condemned by 'former comrades' and where the state has not only adopted heightened anti-terror provisions but also introduced counter extremist discourses to the equation.
As such, VDR funerals go some length to reflect the traditional Irish republican maxim that armed struggle will always exist and will always be legitimate until and unless the core issue of British occupation in the six counties is addressed. On the other hand this process of burying the dead as soldiers extends beyond the historic tropes in VDR discourse to become amenable to spoiling through performative 'propaganda by the deed'. It aids mobilisation by tapping into the emotive undercurrents of martyrdom, by allowing VDR groups to assert their continued existence and by enabling them to appeal for support. By flaunting scores of masked volunteers in public, by implying violence through the ceremonial firing of shots over coffins and by bringing hundreds of supporters on to the streets through these spectacles, VDR funerals cut against the grain of post-GFA normalisation discourses in a very publicised and visual way.
Although these occasions are not part of an overarching VDR military strategy they have nonetheless been shown to challenge normalisation processes in the short term in the same way as isolated military attacks can. Militarily they may have little to offer, particularly in terms of making tangible progress towards the ultimate VDR goal of self-determination through armed struggle, but propagandistically and politically they have considerable currency in the immediate term VDR goal of disrupting key aspects of normalisation. As 'propaganda by the deed' they are as useful as any military attack against security targets. In conclusion, it must be acknowledged that highly performative nonviolence as seen in VDR funerals and commemorations represents a key VDR spoiling activity in post-GFA Northern Ireland.
